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SUMMARY: Subcontracting has become very widespread in contemporary socio-technical systems. It takes 
many forms and leads us to think again about the nature of the workforce. This article takes a new look at 
organizational boundaries in terms of the concept of businesses that are extended through subcontracting and 
its implications for safety culture. First we present a comprehensive, state of the art typology of the current 
forms of subcontracting, which have been developed to meet the needs of productive organizations. Then we 
focus on the effects of this type of indirect management on the effectiveness and reliability of organizations 
and more specifically, the workforce. 
 
 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Since the beginning of the twentieth century, we 
have seen a change in the way businesses are 
organized. Until the end of the 1970s an integrative 
model dominated. Under this model companies 
themselves were responsible for most of the 
manufacturing of the final product and all 
production functions were integrated. In the early 
1970s, companies became large corporate networks 
(a multi- or poly-cellular model). The contracting 
company headed the network; it was only 
responsible for a very limited part of production/ 
manufacturing and was surrounded by a network of 
suppliers/ partners.  
This new model can be seen as offering the best 
prospects in an increasingly unstable economic 
context. Nowadays it takes many forms: the 
extended organization (Benchimol 1993; Capraro & 
Baglin 2002; Perez 2007; Defelix & Picq 2013), the 
fragmented organization (Hatzfeld 2000; Berger 
2005), the network organization (Veltz 2000; Roy & 
Audet 2002; Rorive 2005; Morley 2005; Mazaud 
2006; Pesqueux 2008), the shared organization 
(Abdul-Nour, Jacob, Julien & Raymond 2003), the 
enhanced organization (Moreau 2003) or the agile 
organization (Barrand, Gumb, Badot, Benameur, 
Blum et al. 2010). These new forms are all examples 
of not only a more flexible and efficient 
organization, but also new organizational 
boundaries, a new way of occupying space and new 
governance mechanisms. They consist of a national 
and international exterior space and an internal space 
that is fragmented due to the diversity of actors and 
skills. In this kind of organization, production is 
distributed in an orderly manner between partner 
companies.  
These changes in the way businesses operate are 
fundamentally changing the organization. They are 
likely to accentuate certain types of organizational 
risks related to the management of a fragmented 
workforce distributed across a network, and 
extended by a constellation of actors 
(subcontractors, co-contractors or partners). It is 
important to understand these new organizational 
forms in order to be able to better predict these 
changes and anticipate the risks associated with 
them. The internal organization of a company can 
become a source of threat. Organizational reliability 
is based on the strategies of actors who shape 
production on a daily basis given the organizational 
constraints they face. In this context, this article 
examines how the constraints faced by the extended 
organization can be a source of reliability or risk.  
The aim is to help organizations that have decided to 
use subcontractors to improve reliability, and control 
 safety- and security-related risks in the context of 
relevant research, particularly management systems. 
Specifically, we ask how the strategies implemented 
by individuals shape the efficiency, reliability or risk 
of extended productive organizations. In the first 
part of the article we define subcontracting, its 
different forms and motivations. In the second part 
we define the extended organization, its 
characteristics and the risks that are associated with 
it. Finally, we show the impact of this ambivalent 
mode of organization on the effectiveness and 
reliability of the workforce.  
2 SUBCONTRACTING 
There is no question that subcontracting is one of the 
key characteristics of the operation of these new 
productive organizations and the subcontractor can 
be thought of as a fully-fledged actor in the system. 
While the phenomenon of subcontracting is not new, 
its popularisation is. This phenomenon means two 
things: On the one hand it has become both 
widespread and commonplace; the subcontractor 
cascade has become common practice in many 
companies. On the other hand it has been extended 
into a growing number of business operations. In the 
1970s it concerned simple tasks such as cleaning and 
security; since the 1980s it has extended in some 
companies to the entire production process (the 
hollow firm). The internal organization and working 
conditions of companies in many sectors have thus 
completely changed. 
2.1 Subcontracting and outsourcing 
Subcontracting is one form of outsourcing. A report 
by the French Social and Economic Council 
distinguishes between subcontracting and 
outsourcing in terms of the length of the relationship 
and the transfer of ownership (activity substitution), 
“It could therefore be said that subcontracting, 
unlike outsourcing, partially concerns the provision 
of a service in a given time and not necessarily over 
many years and – most importantly – does not imply 
that the activity was previously undertaken 
internally. Outsourcing is further distinguished from 
subcontracting in that it tends to lead to long-term 
change (by subtraction from the original company to 
an economic third party) in the boundaries of the 
company and the structural configuration of its 
resources. It could be called a ‘contractualised’ and 
‘monetised’ handover of a function or activity 
previously included in the internal mode of 
governance.”1 
The concept of semi-integrated subcontracting 
(Houssiaux 1957) is based on the principle of 
substitution and the transfer of ownership of a 
specific piece of work; however it implies that there 
are ongoing and stable links. According to 
Barthélemy (2007, p. 12), the difference between 
subcontracting and outsourcing is based on the 
obligations of the service provider. Outsourcing is 
based on an obligation to provide results; the service 
provider takes entire responsibility for the 
management of the outsourced activity. In the case 
of subcontracting, the client is responsible for the 
management of the outsourced activity and the 
service provider merely provides production 
resources. Nevertheless, subcontractors are also 
obliged to produce results, and can be seen as the 
intervention of an external agent on at least three 
levels: the definition of work, its resources and the 
procedures put in place to achieve a specified 
outcome. In some cases, highly-qualified 
subcontractors may participate in drawing up 
specifications (Chaillou 1977).  
Nevertheless, the difference between outsourcing 
and subcontracting remains ambiguous. Inter-
company links are varied and in many cases go 
beyond official definitions, which give an 
incomplete picture of labour relations, “a little like 
concrete can mask the girders it supports” (Jounin 
2006). In a very general and basic way, we define 
subcontracting2  as an operation that consists, for a 
company A, of the delegation to a company B of a 
task or a function that Company A does not want to 
or cannot undertake itself. 
2.2 The various forms of subcontracting 
In order to understand the different forms that 
subcontracting can take within organizations, 
Chaillou (1977) proposed a typology, in which time 
is a fundamental characteristic for understanding the 
relationship between businesses. He distinguishes 
short-term subcontracting (comparable to 
occasional, cyclical troubleshooting) and long-term 
                                                          
1
 Social and Economic Council (Conseil économique et social), 
Conséquences sur l’emploi et le travail des stratégies 
d’externalisation des activités, The Official Journal (Les 
éditions des journaux officiels), 2005, p.92 
2
 The French law of 31 December 1975 defines subcontracting 
as “the operation by which a business entrusts, through a 
subcontract and under their responsibility, to another person 
called a subcontractor, all or part of the execution of a business 
contract or a public tender concluded with the client.” 
 activities that can be compared to permanent, 
structural or semi-integrated subcontracting that is 
more akin to outsourcing (Houssiaux in Baudry 
2013). The contract frames the length of the 
relationship between the client and the 
subcontractor.  
At the same time, it is vital to identify areas where 
subcontracting can be used: on-site, internally or 
externally. External subcontracting may be local or 
abroad, known as offshore or delocalized 
outsourcing (Niang 2013). This practice runs the 
risks found in both outsourcing and offshoring 
(Geyer 2007) – loss of control and ownership of one 
or more delegated activities. In this case, it is up to 
the organization to decide whether it is in its 
interests to expand its borders. Ponnet (2011) also 
distinguishes between the activities carried out on 
the contractor’s premises and those performed 
externally. She noted that maintenance work is semi-
integrated and carried out at the contractor’s 
production facilities.  
In cases where subcontracting is carried out in the 
organization’s country of residence, it is more like 
classical subcontracting or nearshore outsourcing 
(Quelin 2007).  
When the work is carried out onsite by a foreign 
contractor, and the subcontractor’s company is 
located in a different country to that of the client, the 
term onshore outsourcing is used (Samaganova 
2008). In situ subcontracting is also subject to risk. 
Jounin (2006) gives examples of field observations 
where employees of various local companies coexist 
and work together to achieve the same production 
objectives. This is an illustration of a constellation of 
actors where the new interactions fundamentally 
change the organization’s reliability, the division of 
work and teamwork modalities. 
Although subcontracting practices vary from one 
organization to another, there are two main scenarios 
that are widely used. In the first scenario the 
company does not have sufficient production 
resources and therefore delegates certain functions 
that cannot be undertaken internally. This is known 
as ‘speciality’ subcontracting, where the contractor 
calls upon a specialist who has the equipment, 
materials and expertise that meets the needs of the 
purchaser, because the latter does not have or may 
not wish to acquire them, for their own strategic 
reasons3. Specialty subcontractors or specialised 
                                                          
3
 The French National Institute for Statistics and 
Economic Studies (INSEE) definition is as follows: Following 
suppliers (Houssiaux in Baudry 2013) carry out 
specific operations using their own methods. Their 
activity is complementary to that of the organization. 
In the same vein, Barthélemy and Donada (2007) 
argue that companies are motivated by rapid access 
to resources and skills that are not available 
internally. It allows the organization to focus on its 
main activity (Mazaud & Lagasse 2009) and to 
delegate ancillary activities. Specialization is 
subjective and varies depending on the organization 
as, “their point of reference is their own technical 
ability” (Chaillou 1977). A specialist is someone 
who is as (or more) capable than the company itself, 
while others are seen as ‘capacity’ subcontractors 
(see below). Chaillou differentiates specialty 
subcontracting from ‘supply’ subcontracting which 
concerns, “the definition and study of methods to be 
used to perform a given piece of work.” This type of 
subcontracting involves a high degree of 
specialization that makes it possible to define 
functions on the basis of specifications that target a 
specific need of the client company. This enables the 
client company to optimize its internal resources.  
In the second scenario, the company is able to 
produce the good or service itself, but instead it 
delegates the work. This is called ‘capacity’ 
subcontracting. In this case, the contracting 
company, which can produce the product itself, 
employs another company (either occasionally due 
to a temporary spike in production or technical 
problem or on a more or less ongoing basis) because 
it wants to maintain its own capacity through the use 
of external production capacity4. These capacity 
subcontractors can also be called consignment 
manufacturers (Houssiaux in Baudry 2013); they 
perform simple tasks as directed by the contracting 
company or client and very often their activities 
compete with that of the organization.  
Although in theory there are several types of 
subcontracting, in practice it is difficult to identify 
them. According to Jounin (2007), in the public 
construction sector, the boundary between capacity 
subcontracting and specialty subcontracting is 
blurred. For example, subcontracting in building 
industry activities is mainly based on workers and 
intermediate consumption, “some of the girders are 
supplied by the contractor, while their main tools are 
                                                                                                      
the application of the Nomenclature d'Activités Françaises on 1 
January 2008 (second revision), in the manufacturing sector 
primary contractors sensu stricto are only those who provide 
raw materials. Conversely, subcontractors sensu stricto are 
only those who receive raw materials. 
4
 INSEE definition (op. cit.) 
 supplied by the general business” (such as the 
crane). In this case, Houssiaux talks about 
‘community’ subcontracting, in which the activity, 
the execution of work or the finished product are 
collective. 
Variable 
 
Weight 
Duration of 
the activity of 
the 
subcontractor  
Short  Moderate  Long  
Place where 
the 
subcontractor 
carries out 
work  
External  Intermediate  Internal  
Share of the 
activity in the 
organization  
Small  Average  Significant  
Nature of the 
subcontracting 
activity  
Simple and 
substitutable  Average  
Complex, 
non-
substitutable 
Place of the 
subcontractor 
in the 
production 
process  
Supply – intermediate production – final 
production  
Table 1: The various forms of subcontracting 
2.4 Motivations for the use of subcontracting 
We have highlighted the different forms of 
subcontracting, which correspond to the different 
needs and strategies of organizations. According to 
Houssiaux (in Baudry 2013) capacity subcontracting 
is mainly used to reduce or limit production costs. 
Business owners can create competition between 
different service providers to get better rates. This 
idea is not new; Williamson in 1975 looked at 
corporate collaboration through market relations 
from an economic point of view. Transaction costs 
theory (Ghertman 2003) argues that the organization 
chooses between doing things themselves, or having 
them done, depending on the cost of acquiring a 
product or service on the market compared to the 
cost of internal production. Barthélemy and Donada 
(2007) noted that the use of subcontracting allowed 
organizations to be more flexible by transforming 
fixed costs into variable costs, which made it easier 
for them to cope with market fluctuations. 
According to Quélin and Duhamel (2002) the 
economic factor is closely related to the quality 
function. A company delegates not only for reasons 
of quality and efficiency, but also cost. For some 
companies in some cases, subcontracting is 
primarily explained by performance issues in the 
workplace. Finally, subcontracting can be a way to 
transfer risks and responsibilities associated with 
production to a third party. Statistics show that 
accidents occur more often among the employees of 
subcontractors (Algava & Amiras 2011) compared 
to the employees of contractors, but it must not be 
forgotten that some companies outsource their 
riskier activities, particularly in the industrial sector 
(Thébaud-Mony 2000).  
Other organizations transfer social risks through 
subcontracting (Puech 2004; Barthélemy 2007, p. 
67). In this case, it is a way to avoid excessively 
high social costs; the imposition of new constraints, 
loss of benefits, lower wages and lack of resources 
can result in disenchantment with the organization. 
Subcontracting can enable the company, in 
deteriorating market conditions, to take measures 
that have a negative impact on the subcontractor 
without having to deal with the consequences. This 
is not an intentional process, but an adjustment 
mechanism in response to market fluctuations.  
In addition to these quantitative, qualitative and 
social advantages of subcontracting, we can add a 
further strategic and opportunistic motivation. These 
concern situations where the company is faced with 
uncertainty concerning the market or its products 
and wishes to test a company or its staff before 
integrating them or buying the company. In practice, 
although the extended, outsourced organization has 
become a dominant trend, other organizations are 
moving in the opposite direction and are seeking to 
strengthen their classical “hierarchical and 
pyramidal centralization” through internalisation 
policies (Veltz 2000). This raises the question of the 
acquisition of certain subcontractors. The 
motivations for the use of subcontracting are not 
always rational, and are likely to be the result of 
poor strategic choices. Subcontracting is by nature 
ambivalent. While it offers various benefits to the 
organizations and can form part of an extension 
strategy, this extension can sometimes be a 
disadvantage and pose a risk to production. 
3 ORGANIZATIONS EXTENDED BY THE 
SUBCONTRACTOR NETWORK 
Rorive (2005) provides a typology of six types of 
corporate network. Of these six, five are driven by 
the use of partners, suppliers, joint contractors, 
subcontractors or distributors. It could therefore be 
said that many organizations extend themselves 
through outsourcing, and more specifically 
subcontracting. 
 
 For Veltz (2000, pp. 174–175) the term corporate 
network is both overly polysemic and restrictive. He 
defines this new form of organization as “a network 
of cellular models” made up of “a relatively compact 
and traditional central core surrounded by a 
periphery of suppliers and distributors structured in 
successive layers.” Three elements characterize this 
type of organization and mark a break with the 
integrated organizational model: market-oriented 
decentralization, the contract and multi-
functionality. 
 
3.1 Market-oriented decentralization 
 
Market-oriented decentralization concerns the 
distribution of activities across relatively 
autonomous units. These subsets are subject to strict 
targets coupled with the systematic evaluation of 
their results (rather than a precise definition of 
procedures). According to Veltz (2000) this 
management mode is a consequence of Taylorism 
where goals become more important than the means: 
“specialization according to goals and products 
impacts on specialization according to processes, 
resources and technical knowledge”. This 
phenomenon can be observed in many organizations 
and has spread to many industries. This market-
oriented decentralization can be a risk for 
organizations. If goals are too general and vague, 
they must be broken down into operational and 
individualisable sub-goals (Simon 1983). Otherwise, 
individuals may take decisions that have an adverse 
impact on the organization and it becomes difficult 
to control the consequences. Herbert Simon (1983) 
points out that the goals and objectives of an 
organization can be perceived differently by 
different members of the organization and these 
different perceptions are likely to harm the overall 
coherence of these new organizations. 
 
3.2 The contract 
 
The increasing use of the contract is a fundamental 
element of the relationships between the different 
units in the cellular network organization. For Veltz 
(2000) the contract leads to “very diverse 
relationships, legal forms, styles and constraints”. 
He stresses that “‘hierarchy’ and ‘contracts’ are in 
no way antithetical” and takes the example of 
Japanese supplier chains. In these chains, the ability 
to mobilize networks of relationships is based on a 
clearly defined, prescribed hierarchy that forms the 
basis for the organization (Magaud & Sugita 1993).  
An extension of the commercial function is found in 
new organizations through contracts that mobilise 
remote resources. The characteristic feature of this 
type of organization is that it is able to extend its 
scope for action while reducing its legal exposure. 
Many economists have highlighted the trend towards 
“vertical disintegration” (i.e. a reduction in direct 
production units legally owned by the company). 
This makes it possible to indirectly extend and share 
production by mobilising a network of actors and 
skills. This market-driven vertical disintegration 
usually involves a reduction of the salaried 
workforce and non-strategic or ancillary activities 
(such as administration, cleaning or security) for the 
lead company. 
Demmou (2011) noted that there has been a 
significant decrease in manufacturing jobs since the 
1980s. The partial outsourcing of industrial activities 
to the service sector explains 20–25% of the 
decrease in the salaried workforce5. On the other 
hand, market orientation and the use of contracts 
have encouraged the creation of “complex mini-
businesses rather than divisions created along the 
lines of traditional functional departments” in 
organizations (Veltz 2000, p. 178). Contractual 
relationships become one of the keys to the 
expansion of the organization. Coase (1937, p.23) 
highlighted this point in other terms when he wrote, 
“a firm becomes larger as additional transactions 
(which could be exchange transactions co-ordinated 
through the price mechanism) are organized by the 
entrepreneur and becomes smaller as the abandons 
the organization of such transactions”. The contract, 
whether between two individuals or two companies, 
allows the organization to expand both on a spatial 
and skills level. However, it cannot alone organize 
collective action, contrary to what the transactional 
approach (also known as agency theory) suggests6.  
There are a variety of mechanisms to coordinate 
production activities, the contract is not the only 
incentive mechanism (Baudry 1992). The 
mobilization of remote productive resources may 
pose management and control problems within the 
extended organization.      
 
                                                          
5
 See Sauvy A., 1980. La machine et le chômage, DUNOD. 
The spillover theory argues that technical progress that 
improves productivity leads to a transfer (spillover) of jobs 
from one sector to another.  
6
 The contract is seen as simply the act of giving consent and 
takes no account of authority and dependency relationships. 
 3.3 Multi-functionality 
The organization distributes distinct functions across 
its network of partners, suppliers, joint contractors, 
subcontractors or distributors. This is the case at 
Airbus Toulouse (France), which divides tasks 
between Airbus and its network of suppliers. 
Production processes are distributed across the 
manufacturer’s internal sites. Airbus is the prime 
example of the “lead network firm”; it delegates its 
non-strategic sub-functions in order to focus on its 
core activities.  
However, the firm also uses strategic, lead 
subcontractors, who play an intermediate role and 
use their own subcontractors. Mazaud and Lagasse 
(2009) found “a high degree of segmentation” in 
Airbus suppliers. There is a division of labour 
between the company leading the network and its 
network of suppliers. Few authors have looked at its 
modalities. This multifunctional character of the 
organization means that it can carry out several 
simultaneous activities, improve performance and be 
more responsive to the needs of its customers. One 
example is the cooperation model that Airbus 
operates with its suppliers, which enables it to 
simultaneously develop several aircraft at different 
sites. However, while this multi-functionality 
enables organizations to focus on their specialty, it 
can also, in certain cases, lead to the loss of skills 
and control of overall production (Nogatchewsky & 
Donada 2005; Barthélemy 2007 p. 65). 
These three features (market-oriented 
decentralisation, the contract, multi-functionality) 
make it possible to characterise and understand 
ambivalence in organizations that are extended by 
subcontracting. Such organizations grow around a 
base unit or an autonomous decision-making centre, 
which structures activities and their deployment, and 
ensures the overall coherence of peripheral 
activities.  
The base unit forms the foundation for all other 
activities. This central core lies at the heart of direct 
and indirect cooperation with a constellation of 
partners, who undertake functions designed to 
achieve an ultimate goal. According to Capraro and 
Baglin (2002), the extended business “has to set the 
standard for all partners in design and production 
excellence, which must unite the efforts of numerous 
partners to achieve shared success in the extended 
company.” The extended organization must 
therefore develop the capacity to re-think itself and 
quickly recompose itself in response to its 
environment and these new links. 
We argue that one of the characteristics of the 
extended organization is that every action centre or 
mini-business forming the network has the potential 
to further extend the boundaries of the initial 
contractor, and to initiate new cooperation. Its 
potential extension, in terms of both skills and 
geography, is unlimited and can present risks. The 
strategic nature of the subcontractor cascade (shared 
responsibilities through a multiplication of 
subcontractors and contractors, the supply chain, 
value chain or overall logistics), which includes all 
of the actors and activities that enable the production 
of a final product (Sofiane, 2009) is specifically 
designed to offer organizational flexibility and 
geographic reach that the integrated model does not 
provide. Finally, there are at least two ways in which 
an organization becomes extended. The first is 
through a reduction in its direct production units, via 
market-driven decentralisation. Secondly, it can 
create new commercial and contractual 
relationships, and manage its resources through a 
network of partners. 
While communication is one of the keys in the 
extended organization it enables them to manage 
their resources and partners – it can also represent a 
risk. In practice, the multitude of internal actors can 
also lead to the risk of leaked information about 
industrial processes or organizational strategies. The 
communication of information has strategic value as 
it makes it possible to gain power (Crozier & 
Friedberg, 1977). Individuals always have a degree 
of autonomy and pursue their own objectives, which 
are not necessarily compatible with those of the 
organization – especially when it consists of a 
fragmented constellation of partners (Vaughan, 
2009). As much as it may try, the organization can 
never completely limit the autonomy of 
subcontractors. The opening up of extended 
organizations through market-oriented 
subcontracting networks can create a significant risk 
of information leak about resources and strategies in 
a given market, and lead to a loss of control with 
respect to its partners and competitors. For example, 
subcontractors from emerging countries can 
monopolize technical and organizational knowledge 
by copying processes before themselves developing 
high-tech industries that compete with those of 
industrialized countries. Faced with such a risk, the 
organization can take a strategic approach to the 
market, i.e. by subcontracting auxiliary functions 
while continuing to carry out core functions 
 internally (Altersohn, 1997, p.22). Otherwise, only 
the quality and strength of the links between the 
contractor and the subcontractor can reduce the risks 
associated with an organization’s loss of confidential 
information. 
4 THE EFFECTS OF THIS AMBIVALENT MODE 
OF ORGANIZATION ON THE RELIABILITY 
AND EFFICIENCY OF THE WORKFORCE  
The motivations, forms of subcontracting and 
relations between contractors and service providers 
vary from one organization to another. In order to 
understand them better, it is useful to think of the 
subcontracting relationship as a form of employment 
relationship. Baudry (1992) argues that the two 
types of relationship are comparable. In both cases 
there is “quality economy”, i.e. there is uncertainty 
about the work of the subcontractor, like that of the 
employee, in terms of productivity and results. The 
author shows that there is a plurality of mechanisms 
that govern inter-firm relations. Production is based 
not only on the contract and authority but also (and 
above all) on trust. Jounin (2006) also sees working 
relationships as going beyond purely mechanical 
aspects. Contracts “provide the framework, but 
within this framework actors build trust and informal 
loyalties [...]. Personality comes back into the game, 
loyalty is re-injected, tacit alliances are established 
that go beyond employment contracts and 
compensate for their fragility.” 
However, unlike the employment relationship, 
subcontractors are in a different, intermediate 
position. Paid work is very often a subordinate 
position, although being this position does not 
necessarily mean oppression and servitude. It can be 
a situation where work-related skills are made 
available to a third party or a contractor. The 
particular characteristic of subcontracting is that the 
company is no longer in a direct employer-employee 
relationship, but in an indirect relationship (Tinel et 
al. 2007). In practice, the commercial contract 
replaces the employment contract. The company 
continues to mobilise its productive effort remotely 
through subcontractors. 
4.1 Transformation of the workforce and risk 
management 
 
Subcontracting may affect teamwork. As it becomes 
commonplace the workforce is restructured into 
those who are directly and those who are indirectly 
mobilised. Jounin (2007) used a case study of a 
building site to demonstrate the importance of 
subcontracting in the construction industry. Out of 
120 workers working on a large construction project, 
80 were temporary workers employed by three 
subcontractors. Among the 40 who worked for the 
lead company, only 15 were direct hires. Therefore 
organizations need to create and cooperate with a 
fragmented workforce with different statuses, 
schedules and functions, united by a single goal. The 
SUMER 2003 survey (Hamont-Cholet & Sandret 
2007) showed that the support of the workforce and 
the hierarchy protects against the risk of accident: 
the accident risk increases by 20% when workers 
cannot discuss with their bosses their concerns about 
how to do the job.  
Similarly, Puech’s analysis (2004) of a hotel’s 
housekeeping staff identified two categories of 
workers, a fixed staff and subcontracted personnel, 
which highlighted the divided nature of the 
workforce. His case study showed that entire 
management of the workforce was tailored to meet 
the hotel’s production requirements as closely as 
possible. The author noted significant differences in 
terms of employment conditions and wages in the 
two groups of staff (one employed by the hotel and 
the other employed by the subcontractor).  
The first group worked full time, had a fixed number 
of rooms to clean and a fixed salary. The second 
group worked part time at a fixed pace: a certain 
number of rooms to be cleaned each hour. Their 
salaries were not fixed because their schedules 
varied between 20–30 hours per week. The author 
observed a significant difference in salary conditions 
within the same occupational group. According to 
Peuch, “the use of subcontracting allows the group 
to compensate for variations in activity levels, a 
particular feature of the hospitality industry. The 
subcontractor’s employment contracts are therefore 
established in order to respond to the needs of the 
company as far as possible, i.e. almost exclusively 
part time.” The consequence was that around thirty 
subcontractors members of the housekeeping staff 
took strike action as a result of a collective sense of 
injustice. While working hours were their main 
motivation, above all, the subcontractor’s staff 
demanded equal status with the hotel’s staff. This 
study shows that the use of subcontractors is not 
without consequences and that the internal 
organization of a company can be a source of threat. 
The organization itself contains the necessary 
elements for both its growth and its death. 
According to a 2006–2007 survey on organizational 
change and computerization (Algava & Amira, 
 2011, cf. Table 1) subcontracting is widespread in 
the public construction and hospitality industries. 
However, most subcontractors are found in industry; 
both subcontractors who carry out the work 
themselves and those who in turn subcontract others 
(intermediate subcontractors). 
4.2 Subcontracting at the origin of both vulnerability 
and reliability 
In this section we focus on industrial organizations 
as a source of both risk (Perrow 1999) and reliability 
(La Porte & Consolini, 1991). These approaches are 
two sides of the same coin and we present them here 
as ways to understand the origins of reliability or 
risk within at-risk industrial organizations. Issues of 
reliability and unreliability are played out in the 
workforce (Bourrier 1999), and are particularly seen 
in strategies that locate actors depending on the 
constraints they are subject to. It is therefore 
important to understand the effect of the changes 
that organizations go through. 
When subcontractors are used there is a 
multiplication of dual-source employment statuses 
(CEE 2008 pp. 57–68, p. 60 Table 1, p. 61 Table 2). 
In the 1980s, 63% of businesses used short-term 
contracts and 59.8% used subcontractors. In 2000, 
70% of companies used short-term contracts and 
85.3% used subcontractors.  
Triangular subordination situations have spatially 
and temporally reshaped organizations. This is 
particularly seen in the widespread use of temporary 
employment contracts, flexible working hours and 
polyvalent/ multi-skilled jobs. Alongside these 
changes in personnel management modes, power 
and the exercise of authority is changing. The need 
for results and constraints related to the pace, 
flexibility, objectives and the assessment of work are 
more visible in the subcontracting relationship.  
According to a 2006–2007 survey on organizational 
change and computerization (Algava & Amira 
2011), the employees of subcontractors were, on 
average, subject to greater constraints in terms of 
scheduling, pace, flexibility and objectives than 
those of prime contractors, and their working 
conditions were poorer. On the other hand 
employees of subcontractors had greater autonomy 
over their work than their colleagues with respect to 
initiatives taken to improve their workplace. The 
survey showed that non-intermediate subcontractors 
(those who carried out the work themselves and did 
not subcontract) received more direct instructions, 
but had fewer specific task-related targets to meet 
than both intermediate subcontractors and 
employees of the contractor. However, this 
formalisation of working practices does not seem to 
have reduced the autonomy of subcontractor’s 
employees.  
The increase in work carried out under constraints 
and the scope for autonomy has at least two 
consequences. First, the widespread use of 
management practices where individuals are closely 
monitored means that staff are motivated by the fact 
that their results are regularly evaluated. Secondly, 
they know that if their results are unsatisfactory 
there will be negative consequences. The client may 
not renew the contract; a decision which would have 
negative consequence for many of the 
subcontractor’s employees. Results-based 
performance means that employees are subject to 
significant constraints. The hierarchy requires 
increased professionalism in order to be the best. 
The situation is one in which the hierarchy issues 
objectives that must be met without fail.  
In an at-risk organization (for example in the nuclear 
sector), working under such constraints can be 
beneficial in terms of both efficiency and reliability. 
The work of Bourrier (1999, pp. 205–251) highlights 
the benefits of subcontracting. Although it may be 
normal to expect that subcontracting reduces 
transparency and leads to an increase in incidents, 
the author noted total transparency regarding 
outsourced activities at the Nogent nuclear power. 
Subcontractors did not hesitate to declare the 
slightest production deviation in order to protect 
themselves against certain incidents. The author 
explained this behaviour in terms of the significant 
economic and qualitative constraints subcontractors 
are subject to. Consequently, in order to secure the 
renewal of their contract they seek to guard against 
any incidents that may occur at the client’s site and 
demonstrate their usefulness.  
However, if these constraints on objectives and the 
pace of work can lead to more effective 
organizations, they are also likely to increase the risk 
of accidents. An analysis by the French Department 
for Research, Clinical Trials and Statistical Analysis 
(Direction de l’animation de la recherche, des 
études et des statistiques analysis, Dares) (Hamont-
Cholet & Sandret 2007) confirmed that employees 
who report “always having to rush” increase their 
risk of an accident by 26%. A high workrate may 
also limit its effectiveness and quality. According to 
Vaughan (2009) the space shuttle Challenger 
accident occurred following a sequence of 
 deviations from technical procedures in order to 
meet set deadlines. The technical culture of the 
aerospace industry is very sensitive to safety issues. 
According to the author, the politico-bureaucratic 
imperatives associated with a cost and time culture 
went against this technical culture. 
5 CONCLUSION 
This paper forms the first part of a sociological 
study. The different forms of subcontracting shown 
in these studies enable us to reflect on the impact of 
an increasingly widespread mode of governance that 
is having an effect on the workforce. The diversity 
of statuses present in productive organizations tends 
to change the organization of work. The use of 
subcontractors leads to both restructuring and 
tensions within the workforce. A better 
understanding of the composition of this workforce, 
and its reactions means that it becomes possible to 
anticipate events and shield productive organizations 
from certain risks associated with staff management. 
Sociological qualitative research methods are likely 
to provide us with a better insight into this scenario 
and help us to assess the associated risks. 
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